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ROBERT J. RHEE*
The Decline of Investment Banking: Preliminary
Thoughts on the Evolution of the Industry
1996-2008
DURING THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON THE financial crisis,' I noted that it was
important to understand finance and the financial industry as a part of legal dis-
course and education. This paper is a continuation of that thought. The financial
crisis of 2008-2009 was shocking in many ways. For me, a major shock was the
sudden collapse of three "bulge bracket" investment banks from the competitive
landscape in an industry that was already starting to look like an oligopoly. From
time to time, investment banks implode due to poor risk management and/or mal-
feasance. The last such collapses were Drexel Burnham Lambert in the United
States in 1990 and Baring Brothers in the U.K. in 1995. These occasional implo-
sions are not surprising. But the collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
Merrill Lynch within a matter of a few months in 2008, resulting in the disappear-
ance of a large part of Wall Street as we knew it, was inconceivable. In my prior
professional life, I worked on Wall Street and the City (London's financial sector)
as an investment banker from 1996 to 2001.2 This was only a few years before the
crisis, and yet the industry that nearly collapsed in 2008 seems very different to me
as I update myself on the industry. This was more an intuition based on anecdotal
media accounts than a developed thought confirmed by empirical evidence.
In this paper, I provide a preliminary financial analysis of the five major inde-
pendent investment banks that existed before the crisis: Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns. The period examined
here is 1996 to 2008. There is nothing particularly significant about 1996 other
than this is the year that I started my investment banking career and, as a result, the
© 2010 Robert J. Rhee.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., George Washington
University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton); B.A., University of Chicago. I thank my former
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1. The University of Maryland School of Law hosted a roundtable discussion, "Corporate Governance
and Securities Law Responses to the Financial Crisis," on April 17, 2009.
2. During this period, I worked as an investment banker at Citicorp International Securities (summer
associate, Seoul), UBS Warburg (London), Deutschebanc Alex. Brown (Baltimore), and Fox-Pitt, Kelton (New
York). I mostly worked in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions.
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year I actively observed the industry as an insider. The year also marks the mid-
1990s, a decade of economic boom, the Internet technology bubble, which ulti-
mately crashed in 2000, and rapid consolidation of the investment banking indus-
try. I provide the following basic data: (1) segmentation of net revenue by products
and services, (2) return-on-average-equity ratio, (3) leverage ratio, and (4) debt-to-
equity ratio.' Although the data analysis here is basic, it still tells an interesting
narrative of the evolution and business cycle of the investment banking industry.
The investment banking industry evolved significantly in the twelve-year period
from 1996 to 2008. In the mid-1990s, banks had a balanced mix of the three major
product and service lines of full-service investment banks: trading, asset manage-
ment, and investment banking. In the past few years, trading overshadowed the
other product lines and became the primary business activity of major investment
banks. The title of this article, the "decline of investment banking," refers not to the
marginalization of investment banking qua the firms. The surviving investment
and universal banks have benefitted from the unprecedented cheap public capital
being pumped into the financial system, and they will benefit in the long-term
from the unexpected, crisis-caused consolidation of the industry, which has re-
sulted in fewer competitors in an industry that already underwent significant con-
solidation in the 1990s and the years following the repeal of Glass-Steagall.4 Rather,
the decline refers to investment banking qua the products and services, primarily
securities underwriting and corporate finance advisory services. During this pe-
riod, investment banks changed their business model toward highly leveraged pro-
prietary trading as the principal means of revenue and profit. The investment
banking industry was primed to take a big risk. The managers at these firms in
essence made "bet the company" type decisions; to boost revenue and profitability,
they relied heavily on proprietary trading coupled with a highly levered balance
sheet. In hindsight, we see that pure investment banks were especially vulnerable in
a way that they were not only a few years ago. The evolution of the industry and
the strategic choices ultimately proved to be a witches' brew for a majority of the
independent investment banks.
I.
For those unfamiliar with the organization of Wall Street investment banks, I pro-
vide a rough sketch of the broad industry organization.' Before the crisis, there
3. The data analysis and outputs are on file in an Excel spreadsheet with the author.
4. The industry sector got smaller in terms of the number of competitors. Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns
and certain assets of Lehman Brothers were absorbed by their competitors. See infra note 12. The sector also
got smaller in terms of lost market capitalization, not counting any equity contribution through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program or other federal bailout measures. See Kevin Quealy & Dylan Loeb McClain, A Year of
Heavy Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/09/15/business/20080916-
treemap-graphic.html.
5. See generally ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS,
POLITICS, AND LAW (2007) (discussing the business of investment banking and historical industry trends).
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were only five major, pure investment banks, sometimes called "bulge bracket"
banks, as a result of the consolidation that took place in the 1990s: Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, the last two
being somewhat smaller than the three larger competitors. These firms provided a
full array of products and services to primarily institutional clients and had large-
scale operations extending to various degrees internationally. They were "pure" in-
vestment banks because they were not affiliated with larger financial institutions,
typically commercial banks. The combination of commercial and investment bank-
ing was made possible with the gradual demise and repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act.6 Before the financial crisis, major investment banks acquired by and affiliated
with larger commercial banks were the securities unit of Citigroup (formerly Salo-
mon Smith Barney), UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston, and J.P. Morgan. In
addition to these major investment banking firms, several other large financial in-
stitutions have also built large-scale, global investment banking operations through
smaller acquisitions and internal growth. These firms include Deutsche Bank, Bar-
clays, CIBC, Bank of America, and Soci~t6 G~n~rale. Additionally, the industry has
numerous niche players that specialize in certain products or industry groups, for
example Lazard, which specializes in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory ser-
vices, and Blackstone, which specializes in private equity investment. 7
I analyze here the data for the five independent investment banks that were regu-
lated as broker-dealers by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These
firms were selected because they are or were unaffiliated with a larger commercial
bank. Their financial data provide a pure look at the business of investment bank-
ing. Obviously, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley survived the financial crisis,
and Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch became the most identifi-
able victims of the financial crisis (arguably, AIG and Citigroup also fall into this
list of victims as well, although they continue to operate today). Since Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies in 2008,8 one can
plausibly argue that the era of pure investment banking ended with these conver-
sions. However, it is clear that these firms are pure investment banks irrespective of
the regulatory scheme they choose to fall under.
With respect to products and services, the activities of full-service investment
banks can be broadly categorized into three: (1) investment banking, which is pri-
marily mergers and acquisitions advisory services, and securities underwriting ("in-
vestment banking"); (2) asset management and other securities services ("asset
management"); and (3) trading and principal investments, including broker/dealer
activities and proprietary trading ("trading"). The 10-Ks of these firms roughly
6. See Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
7. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 5, at 304-08, 311-14.
8. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1-2 (Jan. 26, 2008); Morgan Stanley,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Jan. 28, 2008).
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break out net revenue into these categories.9 Investment banking and asset manage-
ment are primarily fee-based businesses. The activity of investment banking can be
risky, such as when a bank agrees to a firm commitment underwriting. Generally
speaking, however, the risk is commensurate with the return. M&A advisory work
requires minimal capital, and the risks of underwriting can be managed through
syndication and pricing. With respect to trading, an investment bank generates
revenue in two primary ways: first, it charges commissions on trades executed for
clients in its capacity as a broker; second, it takes proprietary trading positions as a
dealer and principal in investments. The latter constitutes a large portion of net
revenues from trading, and its activity is only possible with substantial support
from the firm's capital and therefore puts that capital at risk. Proprietary trading
and principal investment are the primary activities that directly led to the distress
of major Wall Street firms.
The data are from each firm's 10-K, or the initial public offering (IPO) prospec-
tus in the case of Goldman Sachs for the period when it was a private partnership
(the firm went public in 19990). Four measures were calculated. First, I provide the
net revenues by the three major product lines: investment banking, trading and
principal investment, and asset management and securities services. Net revenue is
net of interest revenue and expense attributable to trading activities. The financial
statements provide segmentation of net revenues by product lines. Second, I pro-
vide the return-on-average-equity ("ROE") ratio, which is calculated as the net in-
come divided by the average of the prior and current year's shareholder equity.
Third, I provide the leverage ratio, which is simply calculated as the ratio of total
assets to shareholder equity. Last, I provide the debt-to-equity ratio, which is calcu-
lated as the ratio of long-term debt to shareholder equity. As evident, the analysis
here is rather basic and not much manipulation or calculation was required.
Based on the data from individual firms, I created composite data. The five firms
were combined, creating a weighted average of the financial data. Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley" were combined as the "surviving firms" of the financial crisis.
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch were combined as the "failing
9. Any miscellaneous revenues or costs not specifically identified as trading, investment banking, or asset
management were included in the asset management category for convenience. Generally, these other sources
of revenue or cost were minor compared to the three major products. See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 56 (Jan. 26, 2009) (identifying investment banking, trading and principal
investments, and asset management and securities services as Goldman Sachs' only three segments).
10. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (May 4, 1999) (detailing Goldman
Sachs' initial public offering of common stock shares in the United States, Canada, and the Asia/Pacific region);
see also Charles Gasparino, Goldman's Results Hits a Record-Firm Discloses Details of Its Planned IPO, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 17, 1999, at Cl.
11. Morgan Stanley restated its 2008 financial statements in an 8-K filing dated August 24, 2009. Morgan
Stanley, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (Aug. 24, 2009).
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firms." 2 A comparison of the two composites, "surviving" and "failing" firms, pro-
vide interesting insights.
Charts 1 through 4 provide the composite data for the five investment banks.
These composites do not incorporate 2008 data for Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers because these two firms were acquired or filed for insolvency before they
could file their 2008 10-Ks. Thus, 2008 data include only Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, and Merrill Lynch.
CHART 1: NET REVENUE SEGMENTATION OF ALL BANKS
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12. Only Lehman Brothers actually filed for bankruptcy, and certain of its assets were sold to Barclays.
Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired by JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America respectively. Bear
Stearns was sold to JPMorgan Chase in a fire sale. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 716-21
(2009) (describing the circumstances of the sale). Merrill Lynch survived to merge with Bank of America. It
surely would have failed had it not been rescued by Bank of America as prompted by the federal government.
See Robert J. Rhee, Nationalization of Corporate Governance and Purpose During Crisis, 17 GEo. MASON L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447050) (recounting the
events surrounding the merger of the two companies and the government's role in ensuring its consumma-
tion). Both Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch would most likely have collapsed like Lehman Brothers but for these
rescuing transactions.
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CHART 2: LEVERAGE RATIO OF ALL BANKS
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CHART 4: RETURN-ON-AVERAGE EQUITY OF ALL BANKS
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These data tell a compelling story. The business model of investment banks sig-
nificantly evolved as the industry underwent a business cycle. Chart 1 shows that
from 1996 to 2000, the business mix of investment banking, asset management,
and trading was relatively stable. These years marked a period of economic growth
and the run up to the Internet technology bubble. As expected, investment banks
were highly profitable during this period as seen in the ROE in the range of 25%.
During this period, there were also two major events in the industry. First was the
1998 merger of Citicorp and Travelers, which provided the model of post-Glass-
Steagall universal financial services and cross-selling of various financial products
under a single firm umbrella."5 Second was the 1999 conversion of Goldman Sachs
from a private partnership to a public company. 4 After the Internet bubble burst in
2000 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, profitability significantly de-
clined as a result of the recession, and ROE hovered in the range of low teens,
resembling the profitability levels of commercial banks. We also see investment
banking and asset management steadily decline as measured in terms of net reve-
nue contribution in response to the slowing of investment activities during the
recession, and trading start to become the prominent business activity of invest-
ment banks. This trend reached its apex in 2006 when trading contributed 69% of
13. Mitchell Martin, Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A New No. 1: Financial
Giants Unite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/O4/O7/news/O7iht-citi.t.html; see Eric
Dash, Citi's Stormy First Decade, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/
03/business/03citi.html (recounting ten-year history of the merger).
14. See supra note 10.
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net revenue, as compared to 15% for investment banking and 16% for asset
management."
The focus on trading coincided with dramatically increasing leverage. Charts 2
and 3 show that investment banks were not always so highly levered. The banks
were seeking greater funding with short-term debt, as seen in the leverage ratios, as
well as funding long-term capital with greater leverage, as seen in debt-to-equity
ratios. From 2003 to 2007, the leverage ratio increased from approximately 21x to
30x, and the debt-to-equity increased from approximately 3x to just under 6x. Al-
though the leverage ratios were high in the 1990s as well, 16 investment banks had
diversified portfolios of business activities, with much of the net revenue coming
from fees and commissions from investment banking and asset management, re-
ducing the volatility of revenues and earnings from trading. Extreme leverage to
fund primarily proprietary trading was a recent phenomenon. When a firm is
highly leveraged and successful, its ROE tends to be higher. Chart 4 shows the
influence of increasing leverage on ROE, which dramatically increased from the
doldrums of the dot-coin crash, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
subsequent recession-that is, until the industry collapsed under the weight of its
leverage.
The increase in leverage was made possible by a crucial change in SEC regula-
tion. Before 2004, the net capital requirement imposed by the SEC required that
"[n]o broker or dealer ... shall permit its aggregate indebtedness to all other per-
sons to exceed 1500 percent of its net capital." 7 This provided a definite, tangible
limit on leverage. In 2004, the SEC changed the net capital rule and allowed invest-
ment banks to opt out of this restriction. The agency established a voluntary, alter-
native method of computing deductions to net capital for investment banks based
on mathematical models to calculate net capital requirements for market and de-
rivatives-related credit risk.'" Given that these models were held by the firms them-
selves and the agency merely approves them for use,'9 the change in the rule
15. Morrison and Wilhelm provide data showing trading revenue exponentially increasing in the 1990s.
MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 5, at 13 fig. 1.4 (showing that by 2000 trading revenue as a percent of
capitalization was approximately 80%). This trend continued in the twenty-first century. Chart 1, supra, shows
that trading revenue increased substantially from 2001 to 2008.
16. See Chart 1, supra.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) (2003). The rule also allows an alternative standard. Id. § 240.15c3-
l(a)(1)(ii). Aggregate indebtedness was defined as "the total money liabilities," subject to certain exclusions
including collateralized indebtedness. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1). Net capital is net worth adjusted by certain items.
Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2).
18. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised
Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200 and 240) thereinafter Alternative Net Capital Requirements]; see Net Capital Requirements for
Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
19. One seriously questions whether the agency had the capacity to pass judgment on these mathematical
models given that it is clear that the firms themselves did not. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A
Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 414-15 (2009) (noting that the SEC assigned three staff
members to each bank to monitor the implementation of net capital per the firm's mathematical models, and
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allowed great leeway and discretion in setting the net capital levels. A significant
consequence is, as the SEC noted, that a "broker-dealer's deductions for market and
credit risk probably will be lower under the alternative method of computing net
capital than under the standard net capital rule."2 This change in the rule, allowing
investment banks to opt out of the fixed net capital restriction, allowed greater
leverage.
Chart 2 shows that the leverage ratio of investment banks began to increase dur-
ing 2004 and thereafter. During this time, the firms were also increasingly trading
exotic securities, such as credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations of
asset-backed securities, for which there was no liquid market. In this regard, the
mathematical models could also be allowed to compute deductions for illiquid se-
curities.2 The agency changed the rule so that it "may monitor better, and act more
quickly in response to, any risks ... to the broker-dealer."22 The validity of these
mathematical models depends on the underlying assumptions regarding expected
cashflow and variance (the old adage "garbage in, garbage out"), and these inputs
must have been based on human judgment for we now know that there were no
reliable inputs. In hindsight, this agency view was terribly misguided because it
delegated the regulation of leverage to the investment banks themselves. 3
In addition to the change in regulation, high leverage was facilitated by cheaper
cost of debt. Since the beginning of the new century, rates have trended down-
wards. Chart 5 provides historic yields on Treasuries, which provide the benchmark
risk-free rates (higher yielding securities are longer-term instruments).24
concluding that " [iIt was, from the outset, a mismatch. Three young staffers against all the financial economists
Merrill Lynch wished to use to design a model that would reach the conclusions that its CEO needed to reach").
20. Alternative Net Capital Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. at 34,428; see id. at 34,429 ("One commentator,
however, questioned the use of models to the extent that it would lower broker-dealer capital requirements
. . . . .).
21. Id. at 34,435.
22. Id. at 34,428.
23. See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at Al
(describing the events surrounding the change in the agency rule and the subsequent effects).
24. The Treasury Department's website provides the data. U.S. TREASURY, DAILY TREASURY RATE YIELD
CURVES, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yied.shtm (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2009).
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CHART 5" YIELDS ON ONE-, FIVE-, AND TWENTY-YEAR TREASURIES
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Chart 5 shows that yields on long-term securities declined steadily, and the yields
on shorter-term instruments fell sharply in the period 2000 to 2004. Among other
things, cheap cost of debt fueled the housing bubble. It also fueled Wall Street's
dependence on leverage to boost profitability.
The data here is not surprising with respect to increasing leverage and reliance
on debt to boost profitability, a common theme in the current account of the fi-
nancial crisis. However, the account must be considered in the broader context of
the evolutionary changes on Wall Street that took place over the past several de-
cades. We see a business cycle: the economic boom of the 1990s, the technology
crash of 2000, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the economic slow-
down of 2000 to 2002. The decline in the general economy at the turn of the
century naturally led to a decline in revenue from asset management and invest-
ment banking. Profitability declined sharply in the period 2000 to 2002. The ROE
was reaching levels of commercial banks and insurance companies, not the high
flying levels investment banks saw in the 1990s. At the same time, we also see that
the capital markets were experiencing a period of declining yields on credit.
Cheaper cost of credit incentivized leverage, which Wall Street firms took advan-
tage of to boost profitability. The factors converged and in the subsequent years we
experienced the evolution of the Wall Street business model.
An examination of Goldman Sachs, the premier Wall Street investment bank,
reflects this narrative. Charts 6 through 9 provide the essential data.
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CHART 6: NET REVENUE SEGMENTATION OF GOLDMAN SACHS
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CHART 7: LEVERAGE RATIO OF GOLDMAN SACHS
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CHART 8: DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIO OF GOLDMAN SACHS
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CHART 9: RETURN-ON-AVERAGE EQUITY OF GOLDMAN SACHS
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The trends shown in these data mirror the broader trends in Wall Street. I note a
few additional observations. The move away from a balanced business mix to trad-
ing is even more pronounced for Goldman Sachs. When it was a private partner-
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ship before 1999, we see that it was highly levered, but the business mix was
diversified among three main lines of products and services. The result was an
extraordinarily profitable firm as seen in the ROE figures hovering around 50%.
Around the time of its IPO in 1999, the leverage ratio, debt-to-equity ratio, and
ROE declined. A return to higher profitability was achieved by greater leverage and
reliance on trading, which came to constitute approximately 70% of Goldman
Sachs' net revenue.
Another aspect that is worth noting is that as the crisis was unfolding in 2008,
Goldman Sachs was able to delever quickly. In 2008, it raised $10.75 billion in
equity capital and received $10 billion in capital injection through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) to shore up its balance sheet.2 5 Despite the market
crash in 2008, it also earned net income of $2.3 billion.26 The net effect was that
Goldman Sachs raised substantial equity capital to protect its balance sheet. Com-
pare Goldman Sachs' leverage and debt-to-equity ratios with those of Lehman
Brothers.
CHART 10: COMPARATIVE LEVERAGE RATIOS
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25. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 179 (Jan. 26, 2009).
26. Id. at 3.
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CHART 11: COMPARATIVE DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIOS
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CHART 12: COMPARATIVE TRADING CONTRIBUTION TO NET REVENUES
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The comparison between Goldman Sachs, a success story in crisis management,
and Lehman Brothers, an obvious failure, is interesting. Obviously, any cross-com-
parison of firms, even competitors in the same industry group, is tricky business.
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Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers were different firms, with different business
models and cultures. We see that Lehman Brothers had always relied more heavily
on trading, and it had always been more levered. In the crucial 2006 to 2007 period
leading up to the market crash of 2008, we see that the leverage and debt-to-equity
ratios for Lehman Brothers increase substantially. This suggests that the firm was
taking on more risk as the market was heading toward calamity. At the same time,
Goldman Sachs was leveling off, and in 2008, it quickly delevered its balance sheet.
II.
Why did Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs survive the financial crisis while Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch did not?27 The above comparison
between Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers provides a hint. We can get a
broader perspective by examining the composite data from the two surviving firms
and the three failed firms. Charts 13 through 16 provide comparative data.
CHART 13: TRADING CONTRIBUTION TO NET REVENUE
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Data for 2008 are skewed because heavy losses in trading results in negative per-
centages and dramatic increases in the percentages for investment banking and
27. They almost did not survive the crisis. During the crisis, both firms were in peril, and they were
struggling to survive. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009) (describing
how both firms were in peril during the crisis).
VOL. 5 NO. 1 2010
THE DECLINE OF INVESTMENT BANKING
asset management resulting from trading losses. Thus, 2008 data are not included
in Chart 13.
CHART 14: LEVERAGE RATIOS
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CHART 15: DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIOS
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CHART 16: RETURN-ON-AVERAGE EQUITY2 8
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A composite comparison provides a few interesting observations. First, Chart 13
shows that the failing firms historically relied more heavily on trading, as was the
case in the comparison between Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers. Chart 16
shows that the surviving firms were more profitable as measured by ROE.29 The
failing firms had greater leverage. Debt-to-equity ratio was always higher, and the
leverage ratio was generally higher. The most interesting observation here is one
that is also seen in the comparison of Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers: dur-
ing the period of 2006 to 2008, these firms were taking greater risk through dra-
matic increase in leverage. In proverbial gambling parlance, the failing firms were
doubling down on their bets at precisely the time that the probability heavily fa-
vored the house. This executive decision and the failure of risk management exhib-
ited by it were the efficient proximate cause of the failure of the three investment
banks.
28. Data for 2008 was not included because the losses of the failing banks were so enormous they were off
the scale of the graph. Their combined ROE was -131% whereas that of the surviving banks was approximately
4%.
29. ROE is a measurement based on net income. The largest expense of these firms is professional salaries
and bonuses, and thus net income may be affected by how much employees take from the firm's revenue. See,
e.g., The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 131 (Jan. 26, 2009). With that said, it is
doubtful that the professionals at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were paid any less than their
competitors.
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III.
The basic data in the above sections confirms two major observations about the
death of the investment banks. First, perhaps the single most important factor in
bringing down three major investment banks was a leveraged balance sheet, trig-
gering a crisis in confidence in the firm's credit and illiquidity of the assets when
the housing market started to collapse.3" In the postmortem on the financial crisis,
there has been much talk about how Wall Street created ever more exotic financial
instruments. It is now fashionable to criticize credit default swaps, collateralized
debt obligation, mortgage securitization, and over-the-counter derivatives. But in-
sofar as the death of the investment banks is concerned, the culprit was a rather
ordinary one-leverage and failure of risk management-something the firms and
the SEC thought could be managed by sophisticated mathematical modeling. This
story was told before in the saga of Long-Term Capital Management, and a decade
later it is told again with the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill
Lynch.
The relationship between the demise of these investment banks and complex
financial instruments requires some clarification. It is important to distinguish the
inherent rationale and function of the securities, and financial engineering for that
matter, from the underwriting, marketing, and use or abuse of these securities. The
three failed investment banks did not meet their demise at the hands of complex
financial instruments. To the extent that these securities could not be adequately
valued during turbulent market conditions, they were a factor in the causality just
as a bullet can be a link in the causality of a homicide. However, financial instru-
ments such as securitization and derivatives were not the primary cause of the
financial crisis. If a stock market bubble bursts with terrible effects, as we last saw
in 2000 with the crash of the technology market or, more severely, the stock market
crash of 1929, should we blame the concept of the common stock or the process of
venture capital investment? No one questions that complex instruments were col-
lectively abused by an entire industry. The complexity and aggregate volume of
transactions resulting therefrom disguised risk and made risk management far
more onerous, imposing a terrible secondary effect of the collapse of the housing
and credit markets. In this regard, no one disputes that the government could have
far better regulated the instruments and the industry.
Insofar as the instruments themselves, however, we should put it in the context
of the fact that the economy experienced the largest asset bubble in the history of
finance. This asset bubble was fueled by leverage. In addition to the banks, Ameri-
can homeowners and consumers were also heavily leveraged. In the wealthiest
country in the world, one's residential home is typically the largest portion of an
30. See MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS-How WE GOT
HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO FIX IT 123-27 (updated ed. 2009) (arguing that leverage and illiquidity
were significant factors in the financial crisis).
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American household's personal wealth. The housing bubble and collapse is ground
zero of the crisis. The value of plain vanilla bonds-residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS)-were tied to the bubble. These bonds were systematically, im-
properly underwritten and marketed during a time of gross irrationality in both
the housing and capital markets. Common sense suggests that when this entire
pool of assets experiences a severe price correction across the entire nation, all
other things tied to them will also adjust, including the multiple layers of complex
financial instruments that wrapped around the bonds. Metaphorically, these finan-
cial instruments were like a Los Angeles-sized congested pool of cars racing down a
fog-shrouded mountain, without a speed limit, at the bottom of which was a col-
lapsing bridge over a steep gorge. These financial instruments nearly became the
asteroid that killed the economy because (1) their value was tied to one of the
greatest levered asset bubbles seen in financial history and accordingly their write-
downs must reflect this, and (2) in mass quantities their complexity injected addi-
tional risk into the financial system by making the task of assessing risk far more
difficult for the market and regulators, which had highly adverse secondary effects
on liquidity, perceptions of counterparty risk, and confidence in the overall market,
particularly the credit market. The notion, however, that somehow financial instru-
ments, like a deadly virus, can wreak destruction through their inherent nature is
one that should be discounted in the public dialogue.
The second observation about the demise of the investment banks is that they
have fundamentally pivoted their business away from providing client services and
intermediating functions of the capital markets.3" Unlike the issue of leverage, this
aspect of the evolution of the investment banking industry has not been promi-
nently publicized. The business segment of investment banking-M&A and under-
writing, functions traditionally considered to be the prime domain of investment
banks-have become ancillary activities. It is ironic that investment banks no
longer depend much on their core, traditional investment banking activities. These
activities are fee-based services with moderate risks associated with them, and they
have historically provided a diversification effect on the entire business mix of in-
vestment banks. In the past several years, investment banks became more like pub-
licly traded hedge funds taking massive proprietary bets on the market rather than
privately capitalized investment banks harkening back to the time when Goldman
Sachs was a private partnership and independent "bulge bracket" investment banks
dominated the servicing of the global capital markets.
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch fell because of poor risk man-
agement in trading and business strategy of betting the firm on the success of one
product or activity, a fairly ordinary explanation in an extraordinary historical epi-
sode. Standard corporate finance theory informs that leverage can boost profitabil-
31. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 5, at 301-03 (discussing the decline of investment banking
requiring reputational capital as compared to trading requiring financial capital).
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ity, but at a certain point bankruptcy risk increases the cost of capital such that
leverage is value-destroying. A decade earlier, Long-Term Capital Management col-
lapsed as a result of high leverage and sharp disruption in the bond market.32 The
demise of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch are just additional
examples of poor risk management. These firms were increasingly engaging in
highly volatile activities, at high leverage levels permitted by the SEC, and they did
not have the capital cushion in their balance sheet to withstand severe shocks of
bursting housing and credit markets.
Given these missteps, what can be done about the problem? I do not envision the
reinstitution of the Glass-Steagall Act. Regardless of the merit of Glass-Steagall's
prohibition against the combination of commercial and investment banking, and I
believe the statute had merit, the issue now seems academic. One supposes that
legislation can simply re-erect the wall, but the politics of reinstitution would be
insurmountably complex. It took European firms several decades to establish prime
positions in the top tier of investment banking. These firms include Credit Suisse,
UBS, Barclays, and Deutsche Bank. Likewise, several large American commercial
banks, such as JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, confronted the same obsta-
cles in building their substantial franchises. Divesting these universal banks of their
investment banking businesses would be no small political and regulatory feat. Any
movement toward divestiture would no longer be a matter of mostly domestic pol-
icy, but would be something that must now be coordinated internationally, absent
unilateral divestiture of investment banking by American firms only.
In the past several decades, the financial industry has undergone a transforma-
tional period of globalization. Globalized finance may require substantial capital
and infrastructure under a one firm umbrella. Banks have gotten bigger not only in
the United States, but also internationally. Not that long ago, New York and
London were the primary centers of finance and American investment banks
reigned supreme in the capital markets. This is no longer the case. Much of the
consolidation that took place in the 1990s among investment banks resulted from
international financial institutions buying up American investment banking busi-
ness.33 A globalized economy may be better served by universal banking, a model
32. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 200 (6th ed. 2008) (noting
that at one time Long-Term Capital Management was levered by as much as 100x, and at the time of its
collapse it was levered 54x).
33. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 5, at 294-300 & fig. 10.1 (describing the consolidation of the
1990s and the trend toward larger investment banks). Among others, these American and British investment
banks were acquired by foreign or non-U.K. banks: Bankers Trust, Alex. Brown, First Boston, Donaldson
Lufkin & Jenrette, PaineWebber, Cowen, SG Warburg, Kleinwort Benson, Morgan Grenfell, Baring Brothers,
and Wasserstein Perella. These firms were generally smaller- or medium-sized firms. Recently, Barclays bought
the investment banking and capital markets operations of Lehman Brothers. Julia Werdigier & Landon Thomas
Jr., Barclays Agrees to Buy Some Lehman Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/
17/business/worldbusiness/ I 7barclays.html.
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based on providing a broad array of banking services and products available across
various geographic areas under a one firm umbrella.
On a practical level, the full service, independent investment banks, in the mold
of the "bulge bracket" firms of the 1990s, are a dying breed. The financial crisis
killed three such banks, and only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley stand as
independent investment banks, their bank holding company status notwithstand-
ing. This is significant because the reinstitution of Glass-Steagall would not be im-
posing a prohibition as was the case before its repeal, but it would require
divestitures of fully integrated operations of many universal banks, an onerous bur-
den on financial institutions. Consider the following changes in the leagues tables
for two key investment banking services, mergers and acquisitions advisory services
and equity underwriting from 1990 to 2003."4 Italicized firms in 2003 are firms that
are now affiliated with larger commercial banks, including Merrill Lynch (Bank of
America), Bear Stearns (JPMorgan Chase), and the investment banking assets of
Lehman Brothers (Barclays), and bold firms are banks affiliated with foreign banks.
The "2003 Adjusted" figures do a pro forma adjustment taking into account the
2008 consolidation of these investment banks into their new parents.
TABLE 1: TOP 10 EQUITY UNDERWRITERS ($ MILLION)3
1990 2003 2003 Adjusted
Alex. Brown 2,975 Merrill Lynch 20,184 Bank of America 24,253
Goldman Sachs 2,634 Citigroup 19,526 Citigroup 19,526
Salomon Brothers 1,756 Goldman Sachs 14,554 Goldman Sachs 14,554
Merrill Lynch 1,596 Morgan Stanley 12,116 Morgan Stanley 12,116
Lehman Brothers 1,013 UBS 10,273 UBS 10,273
First Boston 929 CS First Boston 7,355 CS First Boston 7,355
Paine Webber 911 Lehman Brothers 6,575 Barclays 6,575
Morgan Stanley 911 JP Morgan 6,031 JP Morgan 6,031
Smith Barney 807 Bank of America 4,o69 AG Edwards 2,708
Dean Witter 759 AG Edwards 2,708
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34. MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 5, at 17-18.
35. Morrison and Wilhelm indicate that these figures are in thousands of U.S. dollars, but this is clearly a
typographical error. The figures must be in millions of U.S. dollars.
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TABLE 2" TOP 10 M&A ADVISERS ($ MILLION)
1990 2003 2003 Adjusted
Goldman Sachs 48,223 Goldman Sachs 60,377 Goldman Sachs 60,377
Morgan Stanley 45,820 JP Morgan 30,143 JP Morgan 40,429
First Boston 41,009 Merrill Lynch 29,838 Bank of America 29,838
Salomon Brothers 33,163 Citigroup 26,773 CS First Boston 34,281
Lazard Freres 25,181 Lehman Brothers 22,143 Barclays 22,143
Dillon Read 22,239 CS First Boston In 20,449 Morgan Stanley 15,549
Morgan Guaranty 15,840 Morgan Stanley 15,549 Deutsche Bank 13,222
Merrill Lynch 15218 CS First Boston 13,832
Shearson Lehman 12,430 Deutsche Bank 13,222
Lehman Brothers 10,903 Bear Stearns lO,286
These league tables show the striking transformation of the investment banking
industry. These two periods represent the Glass-Steagall and post-repeal eras. In
1990, the activity of investment banking was performed by independent investment
banks. Tables 1 and 2, as adjusted for the events of 2008, show that only Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley remain independent. They also show that the business
of investment banking has been truly globalized and that foreign firms have also
become market leaders. The landscape of investment banking has changed
permanently.
It remains a question whether even Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, patri-
cians of investment banking, can maintain their independence, and one would not
be surprised to see them be acquired once valuations are sufficiently high to incen-
tivize a voluntary sale.36 In an era of increasing volatility in the markets, the next
financial storm could be the last for a thinly capitalized investment bank, absent
regulatory mandates on minimum capital and perhaps other safeguards. Soon
enough, the pure securities firm may be a thing of the past, either because they
meet their demise or because they combine with a larger financial institution.
Given the level of market consolidation, the internationalization of investment
banking, and the globalization of finance, the practical hurdles of reinstituting a
wall between commercial and investment banking may be too high. It seems that
the genie is out of the bottle.
36. One can speculate that there are only a few natural acquirers. The marriage of commercial and invest-
ment banking is tricky. I would not be surprised to see Deutsche Bank acquire one of these firms in the future,
more likely Morgan Stanley. Like Bank of America, Deutsche Bank has long coveted a prime investment bank-
ing franchise, and it has a history of acquiring investment banks such as Morgan Grenfell and Bankers Trust
(including Alex. Brown). It is big enough to make such an acquisition, and because it conducts major invest-
ment banking activities already, integration would be less of an issue than it would be for some other commer-
cial banks.
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Obviously, the industry must be better regulated. This topic is best left for an-
other day, except to suggest that, as we have seen, leverage is clearly an issue. It is
measurable and, as such, susceptible to bright-line limits. The most prominent fail-
ure of government regulation with respect to the demise of the investment banks
was the SEC's decision to loosen limits on capital for pure investment banks. This
regulatory decision had disastrous consequences on the industry, and the SEC must
bear a large share of the blame for its failure to regulate properly the investment
banking industry and its misguided belief that mathematical models of investment
banks could be the basis for regulating their capital limits.37 The agency removed
the capital safeguard, the external limitation that could have tamed the urgency of
bubble psychology and self-destructive behavior. For example, just eye-balling
Charts 2, 3, 14, and 15, without any other analysis, it seems that a leverage ratio
exceeding 30x and a debt-to-equity ratio at or exceeding 3x may place the firm in a
zone of danger upon a stressful event. Certain firms are systemically important to
the financial markets. No one will seriously argue that firms like Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley, the two firms left standing after the carnage of 2008, are not
systemically important firms. The collapse of these types of firms would impose
greater risk of secondary and tertiary effects. It is possible to make these kinds of
firms less risky by regulating capital structure.
This paper presents some preliminary thoughts as I consider the evolution of the
investment banking industry to its current form. My thoughts here concern the
investment banking industry, and not the broader causes of the financial crisis. I
stress the preliminary nature of the inquiry here, which is based on rather elemen-
tary information. Nevertheless, my conclusions are fairly consistent with the pre-
vailing narrative on the financial crisis. This paper provides a broader perspective
on the demise of the majority of the pure, full-service investment banks. A histori-
cal perspective showing the business cycle of investment banks is needed to under-
stand more completely why major investment banking houses fell so suddenly and
collectively in the dark months of summer and fall of 2008.
The basic analysis presented here suggests that one such cause is the way Wall
Street organized itself in the 1990s and at the turn of the new century, and the way
the industry attempted to reverse the adverse fortunes associated with the eco-
nomic downturn in 2000 to 2002. With declining profitability and an erosion of
investment banking business, the firms increasingly relied on trading as a source of
revenue and profit. In doing this, they also lobbied the SEC to change the rules of
leverage and minimum capital requirements. A compliant SEC loosened the regula-
37. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 416 ("In combination then, the investment banks were motivated to raise
their leverage levels and abandon diversification at the same time as the SEC was inclined to pursue deregula-
tion. The combination was deadly.").
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tory constraints. By 2007, some of these banks were essentially public hedge funds,
taking massive, highly levered bets on the housing market. They were susceptible to
a volatile market in a way that they were not only a few years ago.
Knowing the past and the present is essential for formulating the policy prescrip-
tions for the future. We will never know whether limits on leverage would have
saved Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, or Merrill Lynch, but an alternative outcome
is certainly plausible and perhaps even probable. What would have happened had
the SEC not lifted the capital requirements in 2004? These firms may have been
saved had they not doubled down on their bets or had they been precluded from
doing so by appropriate regulatory limits on leverage. In thinking about regulation,
we should weigh the profitability concerns of the firms and their right to freely
engage in financial enterprise against the dangers posed to the greater public and
the capital market from the realization of systemic risk. Lastly, it is good habit to
institute counterfactual regulations to retrofit law with the goal of preventing the
last crisis, but we should also be humble and recognize that we lack the foresight to
predict the next catastrophe or crash. A conservative philosophy of prudential lim-
its on "bet the firm" type financial risk-taking may be needed for some financial
institutions that are systemically integrated into the fabric of the capital markets.
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